This paper provides a policymaker's perspective on some lessons from the recent financial crisis. It focuses on questions in three areas. First, what lessons can be drawn regarding the institutional framework for monetary policy? Has the experience changed the pre-crisis consensus that monetary policy is best performed by an independent central bank focused on achieving and maintaining price stability? Second, what lessons can be drawn regarding the monetary policy strategy that should be followed by a central bank? How activist should a central bank be in dampening macroeconomic fluctuations? Should the "output gap" serve as an important policy guide? Are there lessons regarding the stability-oriented approach followed by the ECB? How activist should a central bank be in tackling perceived asset price misalignments? Does the ECB's monetary analysis pillar help incorporate the pertinent information in formulating policy? Third, is monetary policy pursuing price stability enough to ensure overall stability in the economy? Or is there room for improvement regarding how central banks can contribute to financial stability? Should the role of monetary policy be seen as completely separate from the broader institutional environment governing financial markets and institutions in our economy? Or would greater central bank involvement in regulation and supervision pertaining to credit and finance allow better management of overall economic stability?
Introduction
The assignment I accepted for this paper is not straightforward. The task is to provide a policymaker's perspective on some lessons from the great financial crisis for monetary policy. Having studied earlier challenging episodes in monetary history, I am well aware of the pitfalls of attempting to draw lessons from a crisis while the experience is still raw.
Better to wait a decade or more, to have time to evaluate with greater clarity whether, how and under what conditions things could have evolved differently. On the other hand, there is no time to waste on suggested improvements in the policy framework if the objective is to improve the odds of better outcomes for the future. What better opportunity to offer some early thoughts on the lessons, then, than the occasion presented by this colloquium Second, what lessons can be drawn regarding the monetary policy strategy that should be followed by a central bank? A perennial debate in monetary economics has raged over how ambitious monetary policy should be, how activist it should be in dampening fluctuations and tackling perceived disequilibria and imbalances. Where does the historical behaviour place the ECB in this debate? In the history of central banking, one can identify shifts in the consensus from waves of optimism that policies could be fined-tuned to achieve more to waves of caution when the limits of our knowledge are reconfirmed by reality. Has the recent experience shifted the centre of gravity in this continuing debate?
Third, is monetary policy pursuing price stability enough to ensure overall stability in the economy? Or is there room for improvement regarding how central banks can contribute to greater stability? Would greater central bank involvement in regulation and supervision pertaining to credit and finance allow better management of overall economic stability?
Or should the role of monetary policy be seen as completely separate from the broader institutional environment governing financial markets and institutions in our economy?
It is not necessary to elaborate on the consequences of what became "the great financial crisis". Its severity is evident in the evolution of euro area real GDP (Figure 1 ). Suffices to note that the level of real GDP fell by nearly 5 percent from its peak in 2008Q1 to its trough in 2009Q2. Events during the crisis, the decisive policy responses, and implications for the future of macro-prudential supervision, were analysed by Lucas Papademos in a number of timely and insightful speeches (Papademos, 2007 (Papademos, , 2008 (Papademos, , 2009a (Papademos, ,b,c,d, 2010 . As the person responsible for both financial stability and economic research at the ECB during the crisis, Lucas has been in a unique position to provide insights into the events and guidance on the appropriate policy responses.
The Institutional Framework of Monetary Policy
The founders of the European Union ensured that the ECB, more than any other central bank that has ever existed, would be an independent institution fully committed to ensuring price stability.
The independence of the ECB as well as its clear mandate are enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. According to the Treaty, the primary objective of the ECB "shall be to maintain price stability". In light of this mandate, the Governing Council of the ECB aims to maintain inflation rates at levels below, but close to, 2 percent over the medium term. Inflation is measured by the year-on-year rate of increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP).
It should not be necessary to remind ourselves why price stability is so important. The economic costs of inflation are well known. 1 High and variable inflation is detrimental to productivity and growth; uncertainty and unpredictability about future prices leads to inefficient decisions. The social costs of failing to preserve price stability can be far reaching.
Inflation is one of the most virulent and corrosive forces in a democratic society, eroding the functioning of a market economy.
The key to securing price stability is to ensure that businesses and households do not need to worry about protecting themselves from the inflationary disease. Temporary upward and downward fluctuations in inflation may occur but they must not be embedded permanently in high inflation or deflation. This result is assured only when inflation expectations over suitably long horizons are well anchored at levels of inflation sufficiently low to constitute effective price stability. The ECB's definition of price stability, that is a rate of increase of the HICP close but below 2 percent a year, meets this criterion. Delivering on this goal of price stability is the best way monetary policy can contribute to economic welfare over time.
Since the birth of the euro, the ECB has been successful in delivering on this task. But price stability cannot be assured by a central bank unless it enjoys absolute political independence that can be used to shield it from short-sighted political inflationary pressures that harm the common good over the long haul. The temptations are asymmetric and well known. Inflationary policies can temporarily ease budgetary pressures, buying time for profligate governments. Necessary adjustments may be delayed. A democratically elected government facing an unfriendly electorate, could be tempted to pursue inflationary policies that might temporarily raise employment and income and its electoral prospects. The detrimental effects of inflation, which far exceed any temporary gains for society, would only appear later on. An unavoidable social cost of a democratic society is that the damage from irresponsible government policies sometimes can be hidden from the electorate until after the next election.
The problem, and its obvious solution, have been recognised for a very long time. Early in the 19 th century, English economist and member of Parliament David Ricardo explained the main concern that led him to the conclusion that a central bank responsible for the issuance of paper money should be independent as follows:
"It is said that Government could not be safely entrusted with the power of issuing paper money; that it would most certainly abuse it; and that, on any occasion when it was pressed for money to carry on a war, it would cease to pay coin, on demand, for its notes; and from that moment the currency would become a forced Government paper. There would, I confess, be great dangers of this, if Government-that is to say, the Ministers-were themselves to be entrusted with the power of issuing paper money" (Ricardo, 1824 ).
Ricardo thought it critical for the bank to be governed by individuals who, in his words, would be "entirely independent" of the government's ministers and stressed that the individuals governing the bank "should never, on any pretence, lend money to Government, nor be in the slightest degree under its control or influence." The object of Ricardo's inquiry was the Bank of England, but his analysis has had lasting appeal and was adopted when the ECB was created. By the end of the twentieth century, the need for an independent central bank to ensure price stability became the consensus view. Increasingly, independence was granted to more and more central banks (including the Bank of England in 1997). Today virtually all of the world's major central banks enjoy a substantial degree of independence.
The credibility that an independent central bank can establish with its actions over time does not only facilitate the success of monetary policy in normal times. It can be invaluable during critical times when unusual actions may be required that might otherwise risk raising questions regarding the central bank's continued commitment to price stability. Clouse et al (2000) , and Yates (2002) for reviews of unconventional tools available to a central bank at the zero bound and Curdia and Woodford (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2010) for recent equilibrium models.
4 See Goodfriend (2010) .
bought large quantities of asset-backed securities to prop up an ailing financial sector and the housing market and to stimulate economic activity. In the United Kingdom, the Bank One of the lessons that can be drawn from the experience with near-zero interest rates over the past year or so is that, when needed, unconventional monetary policy measures can be effectively deployed to engineer additional easing to prevent deflation. With this in mind, I see absolutely no reason to tolerate corrosive higher inflation in order to reduce the probability that policy rates may occasionally have to be very close to zero.
The Strategy of Monetary Policy
There There is less agreement, however, about a third aspect of monetary policy strategy. This aspect concerns the degree of policy activism that should be employed as a central bank seeks to dampen economic fluctuations and address perceived disequilibria. We may distinguish between two alternative views: the activist view and the stability-oriented view. The activist view suggests that, in addition to price stability, an equally important goal of monetary policy is to guide the economy towards attainment of its ideal "potential" level of activity.
That is, an important guide to policy is the "output gap", which measures how far GDP deviates from its potential. In contrast to the activist view, the stability-oriented approach could be characterised as attempting to dampen economic fluctuations by promoting stable economic growth over time, subject to a primary focus on maintaining price stability. The stability-oriented view more closely describes the monetary policy strategy of the ECB than the activist view. A perennial debate in monetary economics has raged over how activist policy should be in terms of closing output gaps. In the next two sections, I review in greater detail some lessons that can be drawn from the experience of the ECB regarding these two approaches.
Monetary Policy Activism
The activist view is motivated by the fact that the academic literature sometimes poses the monetary policy problem as the solution to a maximisation problem with not one but two main objectives: getting inflation as close to its assumed target, consistent with price stability, and getting real economic activity close to its ideal "potential" level, defined as the equilibrium or natural level of output that is consistent with price stability. 5
Let p and q denote (the logarithms of) the price level and real output, respectively, and define the rate of inflation π ≡ ∆p. Then, using "stars" to mark the ideal target values of respective variables, we can use π * to denote the numerical definition of price stability and q * to denote the level of potential GDP.
The activist approach to monetary policy imparts greater symmetry on closing the inflation gap (π − π * ) and the output gap (q − q * ) than alternative approaches. Thus, to the extent that this is feasible, activist policies prescribe that monetary policy should not only focus on achieving its price stability objective (that is closing the inflation gap) but also on closing the output gap. A constraining factor to achieving both results is presented in the form of a Phillips curve. A policy tightening can, by opening a negative gap, lead to dampening inflation pressures and vice versa.
There are two types of activist policies: those that rely on a simple activist policy rule and those that claim broader optimality properties. The latter can be seen as attempting to devise a policy plan that balances the inflation and output gaps in the outlook, accounting as precisely as possible for model dynamics. 6,7 The alternative approach, that is relying on an activist monetary policy rule to achieve an approximate balance, is simpler. A common reference to the latter approach is the Taylor (1993) rule:
where i is the policy rate and r * the natural or equilibrium rate of interest. 8
5 Equivalent definitions may also be expressed in terms of the natural rate of employment and unemployment and are robust to alternative models of the process of inflation determination, as explained by Modigliani and Papademos (1975) in the discussion that defined the NIRU (non-inflationary rate of unemployment) concept.
6 The so called "flexible" inflation targeting approach to monetary policy is sometimes presented in this manner by some authors. See, among others, Svensson (2002) and McCallum and Nelson (2005) .
7 The intellectual underpinnings of the approach relate to the optimal control approach to monetary policy that was developed in the 1970s. This was an active area of research to which Lucas Papademos, starting with his Ph.D. thesis, contributed considerably (Athans et al (1977) , Papademos (1977 Papademos ( , 1981 , Papademos (1976, 1978) .
8 Taylor (1999) , Orphanides (2003b) and Taylor and Williams (2010) review the development and rationale for this and related simple monetary policy rules. The specification of such simple rules for a central bank's policy rate abstracts from the zero-lower-bound problem. As mentioned earlier, unconventional policy measures come into play when short-term rates approach zero.
Either approach to activism potentially suffers from a crucial practical pitfall: the need of accurate measurements of the level of potential output to measure the output gap, (q−q * ).
Output gaps are notoriously difficult to construct in real time, and without reliable estimates these activist approaches can run into problems. 9
Next, I review some illustrative evidence regarding the potential usefulness of the activist approach drawing on the recent experience of the ECB. However, since the ECB's policy cannot be characterised by this approach and the ECB does not even publish estimates of the output gap for the euro area, this illustrative evidence must be based on other sources.
In what follows, I rely on the pertinent analysis presented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its World Economic Outlook (WEO) publications. The WEO is useful for two reasons: First, it presents the necessary data and analysis either in the publication or in the associated electronic databases. And second, in the years examined, the policy recommendations appear to have been influenced by readings of the output gap and, in this sense, they have had an activist bent.
Two specific episodes, when the ECB was concerned about inflation and was in a policy tightening mode, present interesting case studies. They correspond to the Spring 2000 WEO and the Spring 2006 WEO. On both occasions, the economy was growing at a brisk pace, but, according to the IMF analysis at the time, had not reached its potential. These are occasions when the differences between the activist and stability-oriented approaches become easier to isolate. in the assessment that inflation prospects appeared benign and a policy recommendation that the ECB should hold back on a rapid tightening. Specifically, the IMF noted: "Higher energy prices will temporarily affect headline inflation in the short term, but inflationary pressures should remain subdued due to the large output gap (projected at about 1 1/4 percent in 2000) and increased competitive pressures caused by the deregulation and restructuring across the area. While the ECB needs to maintain a strong anti-inflationary stance, and a gradual shift to a less accommodative stance is to be expected as slack is absorbed, inflation prospects remain benign and it is important currently to avoid holding back the ongoing recovery through a rapid tightening of policy" (IMF, 2000, p. 18) . Thus, the crisis has reconfirmed the lesson that activist monetary policy cannot work, simply because of our inability to possess reliable estimates of the output gap in real time.
All in all, the size of revisions in estimates of the output gap for the euro area, as shown in the IMF analysis, suggests that the ECB is correct to eschew the activist approach to policy.
This lesson against activism in monetary policy is not new. It is just a reconfirmation of earlier similar experiences, for example the disastrous experience of the Federal Reserve during the 1970s when warnings against the activist approach were not heeded. 12
The Stability-Oriented View and Robust Simple Rules
It is not necessary to rely on activist guidelines to formulate effective monetary policy.
The alternative, stability-oriented approach appears less ambitious. Its relative strength is in consistently preserving price stability, stressing robustness over optimality. As an illustration, in this section I provide an example of a simple policy rule along these lines that I have found useful to monitor, among other things, over the past several years. 13 The policy rule is a simple difference rule that can be thought of as providing prescriptions for quarterly changes of the policy rate based on the evolution of inflation and real GDP growth:
Rules of this type have been extensively investigated in quantitative evaluations and have been found to be robust to various sources of misspecification and to the possibility (in reality the certainty) of imperfect knowledge on the part of policymakers and of businesses and households in the model economies. 14 12 See e.g. Orphanides (2003a) and Williams (2005, 2010 14 See e.g. Williams (2002, 2008) and the references cited therein.
The intellectual underpinnings of this rule connect with the writings of Knut Wicksell
at the end of the 19 th century and those of Milton Friedman in the middle of the 20 th century, as well as numerous other authors. The common thread is the desire to find a simple monetary policy guide that can lead to reasonably robust policy without requiring precise information about theoretical concepts such as the various "natural rates" (e.g. the definition of full employment or potential output, or the equilibrium real interest rate) that cannot be reliably observed or measured when policy is set. Estimates of output gaps are not needed for guiding policy in this approach, only a sense of the economy's trend growth, which is subject to considerably less uncertainty.
The link to Friedman comes from the idea that a robust rule for ensuring long-term monetary stability is for the central bank to maintain a constant rate of growth of the money supply-Milton Friedman's k-percent rule. This is an example of a policy rule that does not require knowledge of either the natural rate of output or the natural rate of interest, but with a money instrument (Friedman, 1960) . The Friedman rule draws on the equation of exchange that can be expressed in growth rates (approximated with log-differences) as follows:
where m and v are (the logarithms of) the money stock and its velocity, respectively.
Selecting the constant growth of money, k, to correspond to the sum of a desired inflation target, π * , and the economy's potential growth rate, ∆q * , and adjusting for any secular trend in the velocity of money, ∆v * , suggests a simple rule that can achieve, on average, the desired inflation target, π * :
Further, if the velocity of money were fairly stable, this simple rule would also yield a high degree of economic stability. Unpredictable fluctuations in the equilibrium velocity of money that may take time to ascertain and operational difficulties in controlling the money supply in the short run for all but the most narrow monetary aggregates, however, do not speak well for relying on the money supply as the main instrument for monetary policy.
While monetary aggregates can serve to cross-check the stance of monetary policy, especially with regard to medium-to-long term risks to inflation, short-term nominal interest rates are usually more suitable to serve as day-to-day policy instruments.
The simple interest rate rule (2) may be seen as relating to Friedman's k-percent rule described above. To see the relationship between rule (2) and money growth targeting, substitute the money growth in rule (4) into the equation of exchange so that the rule can be stated in terms of the velocity of money:
Consider now the simplest formulation of money demand as a (log-) linear relationship between velocity deviations from its equilibrium and the rate of interest. In difference form this is
where a > 0 and e summarises short-run money demand dynamics and temporary velocity disturbances. To reformulate the k-percent money growth rule in terms of an interest rate rule, while avoiding the short-run velocity fluctuations, e, one may substitute the remaining part of (6) into (5). This yields rule (2) for some θ = θ π = θ ∆q > 0.
The link to Wicksell derives from his work on interest and prices, where he argued that price stability could be maintained in an economy if the market interest rate were always equal to the economy's natural rate of interest, r * . Wicksell examined how the central bank might adjust the rate of interest to achieve price stability. Recognising that the natural rate of interest is unavoidably an abstract concept, however, Wicksell did not advise that the central bank first take a stand on what the natural rate is in order to formulate policy:
"This does not mean that the bank ought actually to ascertain the natural rate before fixing their own rates of interest. That would, of course, be impracticable, and would also be quite unnecessary" (Wicksell, 1898 (Wicksell, [1936 , p. 189, emphasis in the original). Rather,
Wicksell pointed out that a simple method for a central bank to maintain approximate price stability would be to follow a simple prescription adjusting its interest rate in a systematic manner to developments in prices: "If prices rise, the rate of interest is to be raised; and if prices fall, the rate of interest is to be lowered; and the rate of interest is henceforth to be maintained at its new level until a further movement in prices calls for a further change in one direction or the other" (p. 189). In algebraic terms, Wicksell's proposal can be interpreted as rule (2), but ignoring the response of interest rates to the difference between the economy's growth from its potential, that is θ π > 0 and θ ∆q = 0.
Implementation of rule (2) at a quarterly frequency requires summary indicators of the quarterly evolution of inflation and output growth, an assessment of trend or potential output growth and, of course, a numerical definition of price stability, π * . Implementation also requires the rule coefficients which are set to θ π = θ ∆q = 0.5 for this illustration.
Since monetary policy is forward looking, near-term forecasts are more useful summary indicators of inflation and output for guiding policy. For the illustration presented here, I
therefore rely on the ECB's SPF. Specifically, I employ the average of the survey responses regarding year-on-year forecasts for inflation and output growth with horizons ending about one year ahead from the data available when the survey is conducted. These "year-ahead"
forecasts have approximately the same horizon from quarter to quarter. As can be seen, the WEO estimates are generally close to the five-year ahead SPF forecast.
A substantial difference appears for 2009 and 2010, however. The WEO estimates reflect an unusually large drop in potential GDP growth, not seen in the SPF forecast. According to the WEO analysis, however, this drop is expected to be temporary: thus, the implied fiveyear ahead forecast of potential output growth would be much closer to the corresponding SPF forecast shown in the figure (IMF, 2009 ). The comparison of the GDP forecast with its underlying estimated trend, indicates whether the economy is expanding faster or slower than its normal limit in the near term, and therefore signals whether the rule prescribes that the policy rate should be raised or lowered on account of the near-term inflation outlook.
The combination of two alternative estimates for trend GDP and the upper and lower guide for the definition of price stability results in four different values for the quarterly change in the policy rate suggested by the rule. Figure 9 compares the resulting envelope of rule prescriptions (the shaded area in the figure) with the actual quarterly change in the ECB policy rate (more precisely, the rate on the main refinancing operations, MRO). For actual policy, in each quarter I use the MRO rate following the policy meeting of the second month of the quarter. This provides the closest match to the timetable of the SPF. As already noted, the survey is conducted towards the end of the first month in every quarter and the results are available to the Governing Council at the policy meeting of the second month. Figure 10 shows the prescriptions for the level of the policy rate that emerge from applying the prescribed quarterly changes to the level of the policy rate a quarter earlier.
As can be seen in the figures, the contours of the policy prescriptions from this simple robust rule line up reasonably well with the actual policy decisions taken by the Governing Council of the ECB. In that sense, this rule is also descriptive of ECB policy. However, several complications should be kept in mind in treating the resulting illustration as an exercise in description. These complications would imply that the rule implemented as described above may suggest distorted policy prescriptions. The complications arise from the fact that the inputs to the rule may not coincide with either the ECB/Eurosystem staff analysis or the Governing Council's views. Thus, the rule prescriptions would be tighter than indicated if, for example: (i) the inflation forecast were higher, (ii) the output growth forecast were stronger, or (iii) the potential output growth were more pessimistic than assumed in the exercise.
Even if a simple rule such as the one shown captured actual policy decisions reasonably well most of the time, deviations would be expected, reflecting factors that may importantly influence policy on some occasions but are not captured by the simple rule. Two such noteworthy deviations in the period since the financial turbulence began can be seen in In the Introductory Statement released after the meeting, the Governing Council stressed that: "Against this background, it is imperative to ensure that medium to longer-term inflation expectations remain firmly anchored at levels in line with price stability" (ECB, 2008) . On this occasion, ensuring that long-term inflation expectations remained wellanchored, proved to be a decisive factor.
Another deviation from the policy rule is evident during 2009. According to the policy rule prescriptions shown in Figure 10 , additional policy easing (reflected in the reduction of the ECB policy rate on main refinancing operations) would have been suggested by the simple policy rule. The lower bound of the range even suggests that, according to the rule, the policy rate would have been set to a negative number for a couple of quarters, if that were possible. This episode, of course, involves near-zero short-term nominal interest rates.
As already noted, under these circumstances, the stance of monetary policy cannot be adequately represented by the conventional policy changes embedded in short-term interest rates alone. On this occasion, faced with the zero nominal interest rate bound, the Governing Council supplemented its conventional policy easing that brought the main policy rate This analysis suggests that the simple rule illustrated above can be seen as an informative proxy of the ECB's economic analysis, aiming at assessing the role of short-run forecasts of inflation and economic activity on policy. In this sense, it may form a useful element in policy discussions. However, it should not be misinterpreted as coming close to providing the full range of considerations pertinent to any policy decisions. It should be recalled, for example, that the ECB's two-pillar approach to policy cross-checks economic analysis with the monetary analysis that focuses on a longer-term horizon. This two-pillar approach is designed to ensure that no relevant information is lost in the assessment of the risks to price stability and that appropriate attention is paid to different perspectives in order to come to an overall judgement on the risks to price stability. 15
Activism and Asset Prices
Another area of continuing debate regarding the monetary policy strategy concerns the treatment of suspected asset price misalignments. In light of the large costs of the recent financial crisis, the origins of which could be related to such a misalignment, a re-assessment of the role of central banks in promoting financial stability is certainly in order. But how activist should monetary policy be in order to counter suspected asset price misalignments?
Broadly speaking, there are two main strategies for dealing with financial imbalances and suspected asset price bubbles. The conventional, non-activist strategy advocates that a central bank should focus its attention on the total risks to the outlook of inflation and real economic activity in evaluating policy alternatives. 16 Interest rate policy adjustments should only react to suspected asset price misalignments to the extent that changes in asset prices might affect prospective output and inflation prospects over the pertinent horizon. Thus, if a suspected bubble translates into ebullience in consumption and investment decisions, a policy tightening responding to the demand imbalance would be in order. And if a suspected bubble bursts, thus dampening aggregate demand, a monetary loosening would reduce the possible damage-the so called "mop-up" approach to treating financial bubbles.
The alternative, more activist approach to responding to suspected asset price misalignments suggests that monetary policy should "lean against the wind" of emerging financial imbalances over and above the implicit policy reaction suggested by the effect of the suspected asset price developments on the evaluation of the risks to the outlook for inflation and real economic activity. 17 This approach calls for "extra action" to be taken on account of asset price movements (Kohn, 2006) . The suggested rationale is that tempering emerging financial imbalances while they are developing can reduce the probability of costly financial instability in the future.
There are a number of practical concerns that bring into question the appropriateness of this activist approach. Even if the presence of a bubble is ascertained, one concern regards the difficulty in calibrating the size of an "appropriate" interest rate response. Another concern regards the appropriate direction and timing of an activist monetary response to suspected asset price misalignments. Should policy tighten to arrest a brewing bubble or ease in anticipation of its crash? The most obvious concern, however, is that suspected asset price misalignments cannot be identified with enough accuracy in real time. Early identification is intrinsically difficult as it presupposes the ability to determine the fundamental value of assets when market forces fail to do so. This problem is fundamentally similar to the difficulty in assessing real-time estimates of the output gap for stabilisation policy. Only here the difficulty is far greater. Policymakers are asked to take a definitive position questioning the collective wisdom reflected in market valuations.
The non-activist approach need not mean that suspected asset price misalignments are ignored in setting interest rates, however, and if the risk evaluation framework is sufficiently encompassing, it may nest the concerns of the proponents of the activist view. In particular, to the extent that a misalignment is detected, and concerns regarding the possibility of a financial collapse emerge, these concerns can and should be mapped into the risk analysis concerning the outlook of the economy. An asset boom stokes inflationary dynamics. And an asset price collapse can create the risk of a deflationary dynamic in the economy. These undesirable outcomes that are associated with asset price booms and busts can be accounted for as part of the overall risk analysis for monetary policy, provided the horizon for the analysis is sufficiently long. Indeed, as Papademos (2009c) points out, because asset price booms are often associated with robust money and credit expansion, accounting for the longer-term risks reflected in the ECB's monetary analysis provides an appropriate framework for incorporating the pertinent information in formulating policy.
Closely monitoring money and credit can alert policymakers to the potential for financing unsustainable runs in asset prices in the medium to long-run. An advantage of the ECB monetary policy strategy in using information from the monetary analysis pillar in this manner, is that it can account for the risks from potential misalignments in an integrated risk management approach, without the need to take a definitive position on identifying asset price misalignments (Issing, 2009a,b) .
The pertinent tradeoff may be viewed as one regarding a comparison of the risks to price stability over shorter horizons against tail risks at longer horizons. If an adjustment in interest rates can reduce the tail risks to price stability associated with a suspected price misalignment at a more distant horizon, without significantly raising risks of deviating from price stability over nearer horizons, such an adjustment would seem warranted. That said, the interest rate does not seem to be the most appropriate instrument for minimising the tail risks associated with a possible asset market collapse at distant horizons. Interest rates have always been and remain too blunt a tool for this purpose.
Enhancing financial stability is certainly a worthwhile goal. The great financial crisis has provided a reminder of the value of longer-term risk analysis, such as reflected in the ECB's monetary analysis pillar. But it has not provided concrete additional evidence that monetary policymakers should use their interest rate policy instrument to respond to emerging financial imbalances over and above what could be justified by a thorough analysis of the risks to price stability. Rather, regulatory tools should be brought to bear in order to minimise the risks associated with suspected asset price misalignment. Which brings us to the question regarding central bank involvement in regulation and supervision.
Is Price Stability Enough?
The crisis has confirmed that a central bank with a price stability objective and insufficient regulatory powers cannot ensure broader financial stability in the economy. The question is broader than that regarding the treatment of asset price misalignments and extends to other suspected imbalances in the economy such as overextended households and businesses, high levels of private and public debt, persistent current account deficits, highly leveraged positions in finance, etc.
The crisis has revealed a general underappreciation of systemic risks in micro-prudential supervision, and highlighted the need for a more system-wide macro-prudential approach towards supervisory oversight to ensure overall stability in the financial system. By definition, micro-prudential supervisors focus on individual institutions and cannot effectively assess the broader macroeconomic risks that pose a threat to the financial system as a whole. This is a task best suited to central banks.
However, for central banks to better enhance financial stability they must be provided with the right tools. In general, a central bank does not face a tradeoff between price stability and financial stability. Rather, most of the time these two goals tend to reinforce each other.
But there may be occasions when interest rate policy directed at preserving price stability is clearly insufficient to reduce risks to financial stability. Consider, for example, an episode of persistently high credit growth in an environment of price stability. Adjusting the interest rate tool is unlikely to be the most appropriate response. Ideally, under such circumstances, the central bank should have at its disposal macro-prudential levers with which to contain the risk of a potential financial disturbance. These could comprise the power to vary capital requirements, leverage ratios, loan-to-value ratios, margin requirements and so forth.
This highlights the importance of ongoing efforts to strengthen the macro-prudential supervision role of central banks (de Larosiére, 2009 ). Macro-prudential policies could aim to contain the build up of financial imbalances and ensure that the financial system is sufficiently resilient to withstand a disorderly unwinding (Papademos, 2009d) .
The task of the central bank in its role as macro-prudential supervisor is to identify and assess risks and, if needed, to issue warnings and recommendations for remedial action. The crisis has revealed not only the need for more effective micro-and macro-prudential regulation and supervision but also the need for better coordination between the micro and macro parts. Considering the important informational synergies between micro-prudential supervision and systemic risk analysis, bringing micro-supervision under the same roof as other central bank functions seems an attractive proposition. Central banks can benefit from, and rely on, extended access to supervisory information and intelligence, especially on systemically relevant intermediaries, in order to better assess risks and vulnerabilities of the financial system as a whole. Overall, a lesson of the crisis is that greater central bank involvement in regulation and supervision pertaining to credit and finance should contribute to better management of overall economic stability. In turn, by reducing the prospects of tail events, this would contribute to the enhancement of price stability.
Concluding Remarks
Unlike the natural sciences, in central banking we do not have the luxury of running controlled experiments to improve our understanding of the world. Our only guide is history.
As a result, crises are unique "natural experiments" that we can mine for information to advance our learning. Reflecting on lessons from the current crisis, Lucas Papademos observed that not only it has been "great" and "beyond compare", but that it has also been "a learning experience 'beyond compare' for market participants and policymakers, including central banks" (Papademos, 2009c) . From the numerous ensuing lessons, I would like to end by returning to two fundamentals that the crisis has reminded us. First, principles:
By staying true to its principles, by always being committed to preserving price stability, a central bank can have the credibility and flexibility required to take forceful corrective measures and serve as the cornerstone of stability during a crisis. Second, humility: We must always strive to avoid hybris. We must avoid the temptation to overpromise on what monetary policy can achieve and remain mindful of the limits of our knowledge. Notes: Eonia is the 5-day trailing moving average.
